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Case No. 950333-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995). 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Rule 801(c), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides: 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other 
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the 
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1) (1995) provides: 
Possession of property recently stolen, when no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession is made, 
shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in 
possession stole the property. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, 
AND PRESERVATION BELOW 
1. Whether the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient 
to sustain the conviction for driving while unlicensed? 
Standard of review. A jury verdict is reviewed viewing 
"the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a 
light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 
862, 865 (Utah), cert, denied, 114 S.Ct. 186, 126 L.Ed.2d 145 
(1993). It is appellant's burden to marshal the evidence 
supporting the verdict. State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah 
App. 1994); State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604, 607-8 (Utah App. 1994). 
A jury verdict is reversed only if "'the evidence . . . is [so] 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he was convicted. ' " State v. Span, 
819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 
443, 444 (Utah 1983)). Accord State v. Barlow, 851 P.2d 1191, 1193 
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993). 
Preserved below by motion to dismiss at end of State's 
case. See R. 286 (sidebar conference); Stipulation to Supplement 
the Record on Appeal (indicating a sufficiency challenge was made 
at this sidebar). 
2. Whether the trial court erred in excluding testimony 
concerning statements made by Jose Alcantor to defendant on hearsay 
grounds? 
Standard of Review. Whether a statement is offered for 
the truth of the matter asserted is a question of law reviewed 
under a correction of error standard. State v. Olsen, 860 P. 2d 
332, 335 (Utah 1993). 
Preserved below at R. 289, 292, 297-8, 299. 
2 
3. Whether the trial court erred in giving instruction 
number nineteen, which creates a rebuttable presumption that 
lessens the State's burden of proof? 
Standard of review. "Determining the propriety of a jury 
instruction presents a question of law." State v. Brooks, 833 P.2d 
362, 363 (Utah App. 1992) (cites omitted). 
Preserved below at R. 345-7. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Appellant Tony Perez was charged with theft by receiving 
stolen property, a Chevrolet Cavalier, and driving without being 
licensed. R. 79-80.x A two day jury trial was held on the 22nd 
(R. 148-306) and 23rd (R. 307-54) of March, 1995. Mr. Perez was 
convicted of both counts. R. 119-20 (verdicts), 128 (minute 
entry). Mr. Perez was sentenced to concurrent statutory terms of 
one to fifteen years and 90 days.2 R. 130-1. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At trial, the only evidence adduced by the prosecution 
concerning appellant's licensure status was the following: 
^r. Perez was originally charged in the alternative with 
theft by receiving and receiving or transferring a stolen motor 
vehicle (Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316 (2) (1993), second degree 
felony), but the alternative claim of receiving or transferring was 
dropped at trial. R. 281-6, 309-10. 
2The trial court mistakenly sentenced Mr. Perez to a term of 
three months on the unlicensed driver count, R. 13 0, rather than 
the statutorily prescribed term of 90 days. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
204(c) (1995). 
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[Officer Slagowski:] I had left my hand-held 
radio in my patrol car and my notebook in my jacket, I 
had asked for some identification, which none of them 
were able to produce. The driver told me he didn't have 
his driver's license with him, or didn't have one, I 
don't recall. I didn't have a notebook to write down 
their names and dates of birth, so I had them get out of 
the vehicle, and had them sit down on the guard rail, 
spaced them, told them to keep their hands in plain 
sight, and I went back to my vehicle to ask them, to ask 
dispatch to send some backup. 
R. 214 (emphasis added). 
Q [by prosecutor Byrne] Now, Mr. Perez said 
they, they had asked to borrow the car? 
A [Trooper Cowdell] Yes, I assumed "they" was 
the group. He said that they had asked to borrow the car 
from the owner. I asked them who the owner was, and the 
only answer that they would give me, or that Mr. Perez 
would give me was that it was a friend of theirs, but he 
didn't know their name. He said that this friend said, 
"No, you can't take the car, because you can't drive." 
And he told me that's when they took it anyway. 
R. 263 (emphasis added). 
No officer testified that a radio check with dispatch 
indicated Mr. Perez was unlicensed; no custodian of records from 
the Department of Motor Vehicles testified; and Mr. Perez did not 
admit that he was unlicensed. 
The trial court repeatedly sustained objections to Mr. 
Perez testifying concerning statements made to him by Jose 
Alcantor: 
Q Okay. Who was driving? 
A I didn't know at first. He called me over to 
the car, he said, "Tony, Tony." 
MS. BYRNE: Objection, Your Honor, hearsay. 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained as to 
what he said. 
MR. YOUNGBERG: Okay. We're not offering that 
for the truth of the matter asserted; just to explain his 
actions. 
THE COURT: I don't know where it's going. So 
I haven't heard what he has said, nor do I know what 
4 
you're offering it for. But the objection is sustained, 
objection to hearsay. 
289. 
Q Did he represent that the car was his? 





Objection, Your Honor. 
The objection is sustained. 
Hearsay. 
It's sustained and stricken. 
(BY MR. YOUNGBERG) Did he have the keys to the 
car? 
A He did have the keys. 
Q Did he give you any reason to think it was 
stolen? 
A None at all. He told me he bought the car. 
MS. BYRNE: Objection, hearsay. 
THE COURT: Sustained. Mr. Perez, don't tell 
us what anybody else said. 
THE WITNESS: All right. 
THE COURT: All right? 
THE WITNESS: All right. 
292 
Q And why did you flee from the scene? 
MR. YOUNGBERG: Your Honor, I believe this is 
going to call for a statement by the other individual, 
however we're not offering that to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted, simply to explain his actions in 
fleeing. 
THE COURT: Well, I haven't heard an objection 
as to what- - are you going to make one? 
MS. BYRNE: May we approach the bench, Your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: You may, yes. 
(Side bar conference held out of the hearing of 
the jury.) 
Q (BY MR. YOUNGBERG) So there came a time when 
you took off, right? 
A Yeah. 
Q All right. Without going into what anybody 
told you, did somebody say something that made you run? 
A Yeah. 
297-8. 
Q So why did you run, Tony? 
A Because he told me the car was stolen. 
MS. BYRNE: Objection. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
5 
R. 299. 
Over objection, the trial court gave jury instruction 19, 
which read: 
Possession of property recently stolen, if not 
satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance 
from which you may reasonably draw the inference and 
find, in light of the surrounding circumstances shown by 
the evidence in the case, that the person in possession 
of the stolen property stole the property and knew that 
it was stolen. 
Thus, if you find from the evidence and beyond 
a reasonable doubt (1) that the defendant was in 
possession of property, (2) that the property was 
stolen, (3) that such possession was not too remote in 
point of time from the theft, and (4) that no 
satisfactory explanation appears from the evidence, then 
you may infer from these facts and find that the 
defendant stole the property and knew the property was 
stolen. 
R. 98 (attached as Addendum A). 
The State's case was not particularly compelling. 
Officer Slagowski testified concerning her traffic stop of Mr. 
Perez and the two others, R. 207-215, and of their flight. R. 215-
216. She identified Mr. Perez. R. 218. 
Trooper Ferguson testified concerning his apprehension of 
the three suspects. R. 229-39. He identified Mr. Perez. R. 239. 
He testified concerning statements Mr. Perez made, concerning 
injured ribs (R. 248) , that Mr. Alcantor had picked him up (R. 
249) , that he had no idea the car was stolen (R. 249) , or that the 
plates were stolen (R. 249). Mr. Perez stated he ran because of 
his concern that Mr. Alcantor may have had drugs or guns. R. 250. 
He originally said Mr. Alcantor was driving, but upon being 
identified admitted that he had been driving. R. 251, 255. 
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Trooper Cowdell, who did not prepare a report (R. 259), 
testified concerning apprehension of the suspects, R. 260-1, and 
testified concerning statements Mr. Perez made. Mr. Perez at first 
said that Mr. Alcantor picked him up. R. 262-3, 271. He later 
testified that the three of them had asked to borrow the car from 
a friend. R. 263. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The State elicited no persuasive evidence tending to show 
that Mr. Perez was unlicensed at the time he was stopped. The only 
evidence directly addressing the issue is the officer's statement 
that, "The driver told me he didn't have his driver's license with 
him, or didn't have one, I don't recall." This evidence is 
insufficient to sustain the conviction. An acquital should be 
entered. 
The trial court erred in sustaining hearsay objections to 
Mr. Perez testifying concerning statements made to him by Mr. 
Alcantor. Mr. Perez sought to establish that Mr. Alcantor told him 
that he had purchased the car, thus leading Mr. Perez to believe 
that it was permissible for him to drive the vehicle. The 
statements were not hearsay, as they were not offered for the truth 
of the matter asserted. Nobody seriously contends that Mr. 
Alcantor purchased the car; rather the evidence was proffered to 
show that the statements had been made, and to explain Mr. Perez's 
good faith belief and lack of knowledge that the car was stolen. 
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The trial court in giving instruction number 19 which is 
based on the presumption of § 76-6-402(1) that possession of 
recently stolen property is prima facie evidence that the possessor 
stole the property, and knew it to be stolen. Chambers held a 
decade ago that such instructions are improper. No additional 
instructions were given to lessen the impact of this improper 
instruction. The jury was erroneously informed that possession 
alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction, when under Utah law 
that is not the case. 
Under the cumulative error doctrine, even if the errors 
standing alone were not reversible error, the hearsay and 
instruction errors, together with prosecutorial misconduct in 
closing argument, combined to deprive Mr. Perez of his only 
possible defense. Absent these errors, a better result is 
probable. Mr. Perez's theft by receiving conviction should be 
reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL IS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION FOR 
DRIVING WHILE UNLICENSED. 
At trial, almost no evidence was adduced concerning Mr. 
Perez's licensure status. Officer Slagowski, who conducted the 
traffic stop of Mr. Perez, testified that, "The driver told me he 
didn't have his driver's license with him, or didn't have one, I 
don't recall." R. 214. 
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The only other statement in the record that can be 
comprehended as tangentially addressing the issue is the testimony 
of Trooper Cowdell concerning statements that Mr. Perez made to 
him: "He said that this friend said, 'No, you can't take the car, 
because you can't drive.' And he told me that's when they took it 
anyway." R. 263. 
These two statements, and the reasonable inferences to be 
drawn from them, are insufficient to sustain a conviction for 
driving while unlicensed. Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-202 provides, "A 
person may not drive a motor vehicle on a highway in this state 
unless the person is: (a) licensed as a driver by the division 
under this chapter; . . . " The elements for the offense, as given 
to the jury, are: 
1. That on or about the 4th day of February 1995; 
2. In Salt Lake County, State of Utah; 
3. The defendant drove a motor vehicle upon a 
roadway; 
4. Without being licensed as a motor vehicle 
operator by the Department of Motor Vehicles. 
Jury Instruction 28 (R. 109). The only contested element is the 
fourth, whether Mr. Perez was licensed by the Department of Motor 
Vehicles. 
Officer Slagowski's statement that "he didn't have his 
driver's license with him, or didn't have one, I don't recall," is 
inherently uncertain. It cannot establish this element beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
The testimony of Trooper Cowdell does not assist the 
inquiry. The alleged owner's statement that "No, you can't take 
the car, because you can't drive," could conceivably be addressed 
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to the licensure status of one or more of the group seeking to 
borrow the car, but could just as conceivably be addressed to the 
speaker's perceptions of the driving abilities of Mr. Perez or the 
others. This unidentified person is not the DMV, and is not 
competent to testify to Mr. Perez's licensure status. 
Additionally, the State did not introduce this evidence 
premised on a belief in its reliability; rather it was introduced 
to show changing explanations on the part of Mr. Perez to establish 
an inference of guilt. See R. 262 ("He made two statements over a 
period of about half an hour. . . . Each contrasting.11); 320 
(prosecutor closing; "So he has in effect admitted that he gave at 
least three different explanations on his being in possession of 
the car."). The State was asserting that this purported statement 
was purely a fabrication. 
The only reliable source for licensure information is the 
Department of Motor Vehicles. Nobody from that agency testified, 
no certified records were introduced, and nobody testified they 
contacted that agency and were informed that Mr. Perez was not 
licensed. 
A jury verdict is reviewed viewing "the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to 
the verdict." State v. Seale, 853 P. 2d 862, 865 (Utah), cert, 
denied, 114 S.Ct. 186, 126 L.Ed.2d 145 (1993). A jury verdict is 
reversed only if "'the evidence . . . is [so] sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
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the crime of which he was convicted.'" State v. Span, 819 P.2d 
329, 332 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 
(Utah 1983)). Accord State v. Barlow, 851 P.2d 1191, 1193 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993). 
Here, the evidence was insufficient to establish that Mr. 
Perez was not licensed. Reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt concerning Mr. Perez's licensure status. The 
conviction for driving while unlicensed should be reversed and 
vacated, and a judgment of acquittal entered. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING AS 
HEARSAY APPELLANTS TESTIMONY CONCERNING 
STATEMENTS MADE TO HIM BY JOSE ALCANTOR. 
The trial court repeatedly sustained hearsay objections 
to Mr. Perez's testimony concerning statements made to him by Jose 
Alcantor. R. 289, 292, 297-8, 299. Defense counsel asserted that 
the statements were not offered for the truth of the matter 
asserted, and were thus not excludable hearsay: "We're not 
offering that to prove any truth of the matter asserted; just to 
explain his actions." R. 289. 
The statements sought to be introduced were not offered 
for the truth of the matter asserted. Mr. Perez, with the 
advantage of hindsight, did not contend at trial that Mr. Alcantor 
was truthful and correct when he said that the car was his, and 
that he had bought the car. R. 292. Mr. Perez's defense was that 
Alcantor picked him up, represented that he had bought the car, and 
Mr. Perez had no reason to know or believe that the car was stolen. 
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Statements not offered for the truth of the matter 
asserted are not excludable as hearsay. In Layton City v. Noon, 
736 P.2d 1035 (Utah App. 1987), this court held that statements 
made by a store clerk to a police officer concerning the 
intoxicated state of a store patron were properly admissible 
because they were offered to show "what information [the officer] 
had that led him to believe Noon had been driving while 
intoxicated." Id. at 103 9. So here, the evidence was offered to 
show what information Mr. Perez had to lead him to not suspect that 
the car was stolen. 
In State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 205 (Utah App. 1991), this 
court held that an officer's testimony concerning a citizen's 
statements about an assault "was not offered to show that Martinez 
was in fact committing an assault, but rather to establish why 
Officer Stickey went to Martinez's apartment." Id. at 210. The 
testimony here was offered to show why Mr. Perez felt justified in 
driving the automobile, rather than that Alcantor had in fact 
bought the car. Accord, State v. Collier, 736 P.2d 231, 233-4 
(Utah 1987) (police officer testimony concerning informants 
statements that defendant was armed and would not be taken alive 
were offered to explain why the police set up an armed stakeout). 
Stated differently, "When an out of court statement is 
offered only to prove that the statement was made, without regard 
to its truth or falsity, it is not proscribed by the hearsay rule." 
State v. Hutchison, 655 P. 2d 635, 636 (Utah 1982) . "Whether or not 
[the] statements were true is irrelevant, since the crucial factors 
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are that the statements were made and that they influenced the 
defendants' behavior." State v. Salmon, 612 P.2d 366, 369 (Utah 
1980) (entrapment defense to charges of burglary). 
State v. Sorenson, 617 P.2d 333 (Utah 1980) is directly 
on point. Defendant in Sorenson was charged with theft by 
deception arising from the formation of a restaurant franchise 
operation, and sought to introduce evidence of statements of a Mr. 
King that financing for the restaurant project was available. 
Defendant sought to introduce the evidence as proof of 
his good faith in making the representations regarding 
financing. If in fact the statements attributed to King 
were made, their truth of falsity is immaterial since in 
either event they tend to substantiate defendant's good-
faith belief in being able to obtain financing. When an 
out of court statement is offered simply to prove that it 
was made, without regard to whether it is true, such 
evidence is not proscribed by the hearsay rule. 
Sorenson, 617 P.2d at 337. 
For Mr. Perez's defense to succeed, it was critical that 
he show that he acted in good faith in driving the car, and had no 
reason to believe it was stolen. The trial court's erroneous 
exclusion of this evidence severely undermined his ability to 
present a defense. 
The only evidence Mr. Perez was successful in adducing 
was the following: 
Q So why did you run, Tony? 
A Because he told me the car was stolen. 
MS. BYRNE: Objection. 
THE COURT: Objection sustained. 
Q (BY MR. YOUNGBERG) Were you afraid? 
A I was afraid. 
Q What were you afraid of? 
A About getting caught with another stolen car. 
Q How about Mr. al Cantor? 
13 
A He didn't look scared about anything. He was 
jumpy, but he wasn't scared. 
Q So the bottom line is you ran because why, you 
were scared? 
A No, because the car was stolen. 
Q When did you find out the car was stolen? 
A When they took us to the side of the road. 
Q And how did you find out the car was stolen? 
A From Mr. al Cantor. 
Q Up to that point did you know that the car was 
stolen? 
A No. 
Q Did you have any- - In Your mind did you have 
any reason to think that car was stolen? 
A No. 
R. 299 (emphasis added.) 
While the testimony he sought to elicit made it into the 
record, it is doubtful the jury gave it any credence. After 
repeated hearsay objections, all sustained, and the trial court's 
admonition, "Mr. Perez, don't tell us what anybody else said," (R. 
292) , it is reasonable to assume that the jury understood that Mr. 
Perez was not permitted to discuss what Alcantor told him, and they 
should not consider any such testimony. Jury instruction 6 (R. 85) 
required the jury to disregard evidence offered but not admitted, 
and stricken evidence. The jury probably felt compelled to 
disregard Mr. Perez's proffered explanation. Mr. Perez's only 
defense was denied to him. 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING JURY 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER NINETEEN. 
Jury instruction nineteen provided: 
Possession of property recently stolen, if not 
satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance 
from which you may reasonably draw the inference and 
find, in light of the surrounding circumstances shown by 
the evidence in the case, that the person in possession 
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of the stolen property stole the property and knew that 
it was stolen. 
Thus, if you find from the evidence and beyond 
a reasonable doubt (1) that the defendant was in 
possession of property, (2) that the property was 
stolen, (3) that such possession was not too remote in 
point of time from the theft, and (4) that no 
satisfactory explanation appears from the evidence, then 
you may infer from these facts and find that the 
defendant stole the property and knew the property was 
stolen. 
R. 98 (attached as Addendum A). 
This instruction derives from Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
402(1) (1995), which provides: 
Possession of property recently stolen, when no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession is made, 
shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in 
possession stole the property. 
A. UNDER CHAMBERS, THE INSTRUCTION HERE 
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GIVEN. 
There has been considerable case law addressing this 
statutory presumption, and instructions derived therefrom. In 
State v. Barretta, 155 P. 343 (Utah 1916) , the Supreme Court 
addressed a precursor statute which provided, "Possession of 
property recently stolen, when the party in possession fails to 
make a satisfactory explanation, shall be deemed prima facie 
evidence of guilt." The court found that the statute was directed 
to the court in determining whether a case is sufficient to go to 
the jury, and further noted: 
We think a charge, that recent possession of stolen 
property when the party in possession failed to make a 
satisfactory explanation was prima facie evidence of 
guilt, may do harm by singling out and emphasizing 
particular evidence in a cause to the exclusion of other 
evidence which may be of equal or greater importance, 
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and, without further explanation or direction, may tend 
to convey a meaning to the jury that when such enumerated 
particulars are shown the burden of proof is shifted to 
the accused, which, if not sustained by him, requires the 
verdict to be cast against him. . . . So we do not see 
what the question of a prima facie case has to do with 
the jury and think the charge ought not to have been 
given. 
Barretta, 155 P. at 346-47 (quoted with approval in State v. 
Chambers, 709 P.2d 321, 327 (Utah 1985)). 
In State v. Hall, 145 P.2d 494 (Utah 1944), the court 
reiterated that a charge on the presumption should not go to the 
jury: 
An instruction such as this one which concerns 
the evidence necessary to make out a prima facie case for 
the State would only be confusing and might lead the jury 
to conclude that the State had met its burden of proving 
ultimate guilt beyond a reasonable doubt by making out a 
prima facie case. 
Hall, 145 P.2d at 500. The court found the error harmless in light 
of an additional instruction "that the State must still prove guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt." The court concluded that 
it would have been more proper to instruct the jury in 
substance that if it found from the evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt that someone had committed the larceny 
as charged, that the defendant was found in possession of 
the recently stolen goods and that it further found that 
he failed to give a satisfactory explanation, there would 
arise an inference that the defendant committed the 
larceny and that this inference might, with all other 
circumstances, be considered in determining whether or 
not the jury was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of 
the defendant's guilt. 
Hall, 145 P.2d at 500, disavowed. State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 321, 
327 (Utah 1985). Use of inference instructions became widespread. 
In State v. Crowder, 197 P.2d 917 (Utah 1948), the court 
condemned an instruction which unduly emphasized the inference, 
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again noting that the making of a prima facie case is addressed 
only to the court. 197 P. 2d at 921. The court found the error 
harmless in light of other instructions and the strong evidence of 
guilt, but noted that "were the evidence of guilt susceptible of 
considerable doubt, it is not at all certain that the giving of 
such an instruction would not be prejudicial." 197 P.2d at 922. 
In State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 321 (Utah 1985), the 
Supreme Court held that an instruction using the verbatim language 
of § 76-6-402(1) was unconstitutional because it created a 
mandatory rebuttable presumption that relieved the State of its 
burden of persuasion on all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 
L.Ed.2d 344 (1985) (rejecting instruction that provided "The acts 
of a person of sound mind and discretion are presumed to be the 
product of the person's will, but the presumption may be 
rebutted."). The presence of a further instruction couching the 
presumption in permissive terms failed to cure the problem. 709 
P.2d at 326. 
While rejecting the instruction, the Supreme Court upheld 
the validity of the statute, noting: 
The statute itself, however is addressed to the court and 
merely provides a standard by which to determine whether 
the evidence presented warrants submission to the jury. 
Thus, the statutory language should not be used in any form in instructing juries in criminal cases, and we 
expressly disavow the language and holdings of our 
earlier cases to the contrary. 
Chambers. 709 P.2d at 327 (emphasis added); accord. State v. 
Pacheco. 712 P.2d 192 (Utah 1985) (following Chambers and holding 
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instruction was reversible error), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 813, 107 
S.Ct. 64, 93 L.Ed.2d 22 (1986). Under Chambers, instructions 
derived from Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1) should not be used to 
instruct juries. The instruction here was error. 
B. NO ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS WERE GIVEN 
HERE THAT COULD AMELIORATE THE DAMAGE OF 
THE ERRONEOUS INFERENCE INSTRUCTION. 
In cases involving inference or presumption instructions, 
the Supreme Court has relied on the effect of other instructions to 
diminish the impact of the erroneous instruction. In State v. 
Smelser, 463 P.2d 562 (Utah), cert, denied, 398 U.S. 966, 90 S.Ct. 
2181, 26 L.Ed.2d 551 (1970), the challenged instruction provided: 
The mere possession of stolen property, howsoever soon 
after the taking, unexplained by the person having 
possession is not sufficient to justify conviction. It 
is, however, a circumstance to be considered in 
connection with other evidence in determining the 
question of innocence of guilt. . . . In addition to 
proof of possession of such property there must be proof * 
of corroborating circumstances tending, of themselves, to 
establish guilt. 
Smelser, 463 P.2d at 564-5 n.7. The instruction was found not to 
be error. But see State v. Smith, 726 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1986) 
(holding almost identical instruction was error). In State v. 
Clayton, 658 P.2d 621, 624 (Utah 1983), the challenged instruction 
erroneously referred to a prima facie case, but further "stated 
that possession of stolen property is not alone sufficient to 
warrant a conviction, and 'may be taken into consideration with all 
the other evidence.'" The error was held harmless. 
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In State v. Smith, 726 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1986), the 
challenged instruction provided: 
Possession of property recently stolen when no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession is made, 
shall be prima facie evidence that the person in 
possession stole the property." 
Thus, if you find from the evidence and beyond 
a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was in possession 
of stolen property, that such possession was not too 
remote in point of time from the theft, and the defendant 
made no satisfactory explanation of such possession, then 
you may infer from those facts that the defendant 
committed the theft. 
You may use the same inference, if you find it 
justified by the evidence, to connect the possessor of 
recently stolen property with the offense of burglary. 
Smith, 726 P.2d at 1234. While finding the instruction erroneous, 
the court emphasized that use of "if" and "may" rendered 
application of the inference permissive: 
Thus, the court explained that the statutory language 
incorporated in the instruction allowed only an inference 
of guilt, and then only if justified by the facts. 
Indeed, the court made the same point even more 
extensively in a later instruction.1 
We do not believe that the jury, in the face of 
these instructions, could have reasonably applied the 
instructions in an unconstitutional manner. 
Furthermore, the trial court explained to the 
jury that possession alone of a stolen object is not 
sufficient to support a conviction, a rule that has been 
reiterated in numerous opinions. [cites and quotes 
omitted] 
The Court also instructed: 
The mere fact that a person was in conscious 
possession of recently stolen property is not 
sufficient to justify a conviction of theft. There 
must be proof of other circumstances tending of 
themselves to establish guilt. However, such proof 
need not be established by additional evidence or 
witnesses if you find that the possession occurred 
under circumstances which warrants [sic] a finding 
of guilty. In this, connection you may consider 
the defendant's conduct, any false or contradictory 
statements, and any other statements the defendant 
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may have made with reference to the property. If 
the defendant gives a false account of how he 
acquired possession of stolen property this is a 
circumstance that may tend to show guilt. 
In the absence of evidence as to why the 
defendant was in possession of recently stolen 
property, you may infer that the defendant stole 
the property. 
Smith, 726 P. 2d at 1234-5 & n.l. The court "emphatically 
declare [d] that we do not retreat from Chambers, " 726 P.2d at 1235, 
and held "only that the instruction cannot be deemed reversible 
error in this case in light of the clear explanatory instructions 
that all that the jury could make of the term 'prima facie' was a 
permissible inference." 726 P.2d at 1236. 
Here, there were no additional instructions to ameliorate 
the harm of the erroneous inference instruction. Instructions 1 
through 14 were boilerplate instructions concerning juror duties, 
evidence, burden of proof, and the like. R. 81-93. Instructions 
15 through 18 were elements and definition instructions for theft 
by receiving. R. 94-97. Instruction 19 is the challenged 
inference instruction. R. 98. Instructions 20 through 22 were 
elements instructions for lesser included offenses. R. 99-103. 
Instructions 23 through 25 defined mental states, and 
differentiated intent from motive. R. 104-6. Instruction 26 
stated that both prohibited conduct and a culpable mental state 
must be proven. R. 107. Instruction 27 concerned accomplice 
liability. R. 108. Instruction 28 was an elements instruction for 
driving while unlicensed. R. 109. Instruction 29 defined "on or 
about" (R. 110), instruction 3 0 concerned flight (R. Ill) , 
instruction 31 concerned mistake of fact (R. 112), instruction 32 
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advised that punishment lies in the province of the court (R. 113) , 
instruction 33 concerned initial conduct in deliberations (R. 114) , 
and instruction 34 advised that not all instructions may be 
necessary (R. 115). The instructions conclude with a verdict 
instruction. R. 116-7. 
No instruction advised that possession of stolen property 
alone is insufficient to sustain a conviction, though that is 
clearly the law in Utah. State v. Heath, 492 P.2d 978, 979 (Utah 
1972); Smith, 726 P.2d at 1235; Clayton, 658 P.2d at 623; State v. 
Thomas, 244 P.2d 653, 654 (Utah 1952); State v. Kinsev, 295 P. 247, 
249 (1931) . Contrary to law, instruction 19 here states that 
possession of stolen property, standing alone, IS sufficient to 
sustain a conviction. That the State adduced additional evidence 
concerning flight and possible prevarications is adequate to 
survive a sufficiency challenge, but does nothing to alter the 
result that the jury was misinstructed and informed that it could 
convict under circumstances that, standing alone, are insufficient 
to sustain a conviction. 
The use of "satisfactory explanation" without defining 
what might be a satisfactory explanation is particularly 
troublesome. It could be argued that there is no satisfactory 
explanation for possessing stolen property. The jury could 
conclude that whether Mr. Perez knew the car was stolen is 
irrelevant, because whether or not he knew he still had no right to 
be in Mr. Gonzales's car. 
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"Satisfactory explanation" should have been defined in 
terms of Mr. Perez's mental state: "An explanation is satisfactory 
if it negates the mental state required for the offense. Thus, if 
you find that the explanation creates a reasonable doubt as to 
whether defendant knew or believed the car was stolen at the time 
he drove it, you must acquit." No such instruction was given. 
C. THE IMPROPER INFERENCE INSTRUCTION WAS 
PREJUDICIAL TO MR. PEREZ. 
The inference instruction mis-stated Utah law. No 
instruction was given here stating that possession of recently 
stolen property, standing alone, is insufficient to sustain a 
conviction. It is entirely possible that the jury convicted based 
solely on its finding that Mr. Perez was in possession of recently 
stolen property, and failed to disprove his guilt. 
The concerns expressed in Barretta eighty years ago still 
ring true today: 
We think a charge, that recent possession of stolen 
property when the party in possession failed to make a 
satisfactory explanation was prima facie evidence of 
guilt, may do harm by singling out and emphasizing 
particular evidence in a cause to the exclusion of other 
evidence which may be of equal or greater importance, 
and, without further explanation or direction, may tend 
to convey a meaning to the jury that when such enumerated 
particulars are shown the burden of proof is shifted to 
the accused, which, if not sustained by him, requires the 
verdict to be cast against him. 
Barretta, 155 P. at 346-47 
The protections of other ameliorative instructions, 
present in other cases, are absent here. The jury was left with a 
clear directive that, based on possession alone, he could be found 
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guilty. Mr. Perez has been prejudiced. The inference instruction 
lessened the State's burden of proof, and instructed that they 
could convict on facts that are insufficient as a matter of law to 
sustain the conviction. Absent the inference instruction, it is 
sufficiently probable that the jury would have found that the State 
had not proved that Mr. Perez knew or believed the car to be stolen 
that confidence in the verdict is undermined. Mr. Perez should be 
granted a new trial. 
POINT IV. UNDER THE CUMULATIVE ERROR DOCTRINE, THE 
ERRORS HERE REQUIRE REVERSAL. 
Under the cumulative error doctrine, see State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993), reversal is appropriate if the 
cumulative effect of the several errors undermines confidence that 
a fair trial was had. Reversal here is appropriate and necessary. 
A. THE ERRONEOUS HEARSAY EXCLUSION OF MR. 
PEREZ'S EXPLANATION COMBINED WITH THE 
ERRONEOUS INFERENCE INSTRUCTION TO 
PRECLUDE MR. PEREZ FROM PRESENTING AN 
ADEQUATE DEFENSE. 
While each error asserted is sufficient to require 
reversal, the combined effect of the errors entirely precluded Mr. 
Perez from presenting a defense, in violation of his due process 
rights. The inference instruction left an impression with the jury 
that Mr. Perez had an obligation to come forward and explain his 
possession of the automobile. His attempts to do so were thwarted 
by the erroneous exclusion of the evidence he proffered in 
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explanation. Each error compounded the problem, resulting in 
enhanced prejudice to Mr. Perez. 
B. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CLOSING 
ARGUMENT3 INCREASED THE PREJUDICE TO MR. 
PEREZ. 
In closing argument, the prosecutor speculated at length 
concerning matters outside the evidence presented: 
I would suggest to you that a much more likely 
explanation of the facts in this case is that the 
defendant, possibly accompanied by his friends, were in 
the area where Bennie Gonzales lives. You will recall 
that was about 800 East and 500 South, and you will 
recall that the defendant said he lived at 400 East and 
900 South. That's not a long ways away. That's about 
eight blocks, easy walking distance. But the defendant 
saw the car running, broke out the back window, and left 
driving the car. He switched the license plate at some 
point in time between Bennie's car and Brian Perkins' 
car, the last witness you heard from the State. This 
action shows a knowledge that the car was stolen and an 
intent to deceive the police, if the police happened to 
see that car going down the road, because the license 
plates were different. 
After he got the car, after he picked the car 
up after breaking out the window, he picked up his 
friends, assuming they weren't with him at the time. 
They bought some beer, which they were drinking. Then 
they took the car out into a field or up into the hills, 
got it all muddy and apparently messed up the steering or 
the transmission, then headed south on the freeway, going 
heaven knows where. 
R. 322. No evidence was presented indicating that Mr. Perez had 
done any of the above except driving south on the freeway. Mr. 
Perez's testimony contradicts the prosecutor's speculation. Under 
3Because there was no objection at trial, Mr. Perez does not 
raise prosecutorial misconduct as a distinct claim in this appeal. 
However, this misconduct is relevant in assessing the prejudice of 
the properly preserved errors raised in Points II and III of this 
brief. 
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the familiar test of State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984), the 
prosecutor committed misconduct by drawing the jurors' attention to 
matters they were not justified in considering. What the 
prosecutor thinks might have happened, in the absence of any proof, 
is irrelevant. The prosecutor is not a witness, and such musings 
wouldn't be admissible even if she were. 
The prosecutor also misrepresented several facts in her 
rebuttal closing. Defense counsel argued that burn holes in the 
driver's seat and on the passenger side floor were consistent with 
Mr. Perez's testimony that Mr. Alcantor, the only smoker, drove up 
in the car and asked Mr. Perez to join him. R. 334. The 
prosecutor responded, "My recollection is that Mr. Gonzales stated 
there was beer on both sides of the front seat, but there were 
cigarette burns only on the passenger's side. But you will have to 
rely on your memory of what the testimony is." R. 342. 
Defense counsel's characterization of the evidence was 
entirely accurate, and the prosecutor's mischaracterization was 
not. Mr. Gonzales's testimony was that "I have holes in my seats 
from cigarette butts all over my vehicle, beer spilled out all over 
the seat." R. 201. The prosecutor clarified: 
Q Okay. And there were cigarette butts, you 
said, on the seats? 
A Yes. 
Q Which seats? 
A On the driver's side. 
Q On the driver's side. Okay. None on any place 
else, on any of the other seats? 
A Not on the seat, but on the floor. 
Q And where would it have been on the floor? 
A It would be on the front side of the right, of 




The prosecutor also stated: 
Trooper number two, who also wrote a report, counsel 
indicated that trooper number two, who was Trooper 
Ferguson, said that the defendant said that al Cantor 
picked him up. My recollection is he did not say that. 
All he said to Trooper Ferguson, number two, was that he 
wasn't the driver of the car, that Jose drove the car. 
R. 343. In fact, Trooper Ferguson testified, "He stated that Jose 
had picked him, Jose al Cantor had picked him up in the car, and 
that he had no idea that the car was stolen, is what he advised 
me. " 
Again, this is misconduct under Troy. The prosecutor's 
incorrect recollection of the testimony undercut Mr. Perez's 
defense. The jury may have believed that the prosecutor's 
inaccurate recollection was accurate. In fact, Mr. Perez's 
testimony was corroborated by the location of the cigarette burns, 
and he had made the prior consistent statement to Trooper Ferguson 
that Mr. Alcantor had picked him up. 
Additionally, the prosecutor's comments imply that 
defense counsel was misrepresenting the record and trying to "pull 
a fast one" on the jury. These statements may have prejudiced the 
jury against defense counsel and his client. 
C. UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, 
IT IS PROBABLE THAT THE JURY WAS 
INFLUENCED BY THE ERRORS. 
While the elements instruction informed the jury that 
before convicting they must find beyond a reasonable doubt "[t]hat 
the defendant knew that said property had been stolen or believed 
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that said property had been stolen," R. 94, the presumption 
instruction informed the jury that they could infer knowledge from 
mere possession if not satisfactorily explained. In combination 
there is a serious risk that the jury convicted based on something 
other than a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Perez knew 
or believed that the car was stolen.4 
Having had the burden of explaining his possession placed 
squarely on his shoulders by the inference instruction, Mr. Perez 
was effectively precluded from presenting his explanation by the 
erroneous hearsay exclusion of the statements made to him by Mr. 
Alcantor. Objection after objection was sustained; the jury 
watched the trial court admonish Mr. Perez that he was not allowed 
to testify about what Mr. Alcantor told him. It is probable that 
the jury disregarded all such evidence, and blindly applied the 
presumption instruction to infer knowledge and theft. 
Finally, the prosecutor's improper speculation and 
mischaracterization of the record probably misled the jury. The 
prosecutor made up a grand story about how Mr. Perez stole the car, 
swapped license plates, and trashed the vehicle, without a shred of 
evidence to show that Mr. Perez committed any of these acts. When 
defense counsel pointed out corroborating evidence that bolstered 
4Indeed, this particular jury's actions should be subjected to 
heightened scrutiny as a result of its erroneous conviction for 
driving while unlicensed based on no evidence. While juries are 
typically accorded a presumption of regularity in their verdicts, 
Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 301 (Utah 
1982), no such presumption should apply here. Where a clear 
showing of error in one particular has been established, it is more 
likely that the jury may have erred in other particulars. 
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Mr. Perez's testimony, the prosecutor improperly informed the jury 
that she remembered the evidence differently. 
Absent these errors, there is a reasonable probability of 
a more favorable verdict. State v. Hamilton, 827 P. 2d 232, 240 
(Utah 1992). The State's evidence was not particularly strong. 
While it is undisputed that Mr. Perez was driving the stolen 
vehicle, the critical question is whether he knew or believed it to 
be stolen. On this particular point, the State relied on the 
improper inference instruction, Mr. Perez's flight after 
apprehension, and his conflicting stories. Mr. Perez's flight is 
easily explained by Mr. Alcantor's statements. While Mr. Perez was 
not aware at the time he was driving that the vehicle was stolen, 
while sitting on the guard rail Mr. Alcantor told him it was 
stolen. R. 2 99. Mr. Perez further feared that Mr. Alcantor may 
have had drugs or weapons. R. 250, 255. He became frightened and 
ran. Mr. Perez's conflicting stories are more troublesome, but are 
understandable in light of the officer's testimony that he wasn't 
buying Mr. Perez's initial explanation. R. 276. The evidence was 
far from overwhelming. 
Under the circumstances, there is a probability of a 
better result without these errors. Mr. Perez's conviction for 
theft by receiving should be vacated and remanded for a new trial. 
REASONS SUPPORTING ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED DECISION 
While Mr. Perez's sufficiency claim as to the driving 
while unlicensed charge is straightforward, it nevertheless reveals 
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a serious problem that should be addressed in a published opinion. 
It is simply unacceptable to allow convictions where no evidence 
proving guilt has been adduced. 
The presumption instruction and hearsay claims likewise 
warrant argument and a published opinion. Chambers has been 
settled law for a decade, yet prosecutors continue to request, and 
trial courts continue to give, presumption instructions based on § 
76-6-402(1) . A pointed reminder is warranted and necessary. 
Similarly, fundamental misunderstandings of the hearsay 
rule continue to persist. An opinion clearly delineating the 
difference between statements offered for the truth of the matter 
asserted, versus those offered only to show that they were made, 
would be of assistance to the bench and bar. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Perez respectfully requests that his conviction for 
driving while unlicensed be vacated and a judgment of acquittal be 
entered, and that his conviction for theft by receiving be reversed 
and remanded for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ;?*/#, day of January, 1996. 
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ADDENDUM A 
INSTRUCTION NO. \0{ 
Possession of property recently stolen, if not 
satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance from which 
you may reasonably draw the inference and find, in light of the 
surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence in the case, that 
the person in possession of the stolen property stole the 
property and knew that the property was stolen. 
Thus, if you find from the evidence and beyond a reasonable 
doubt \(1)\ that the defendant was in possession of property, u2)V 
that the property was stolen, f(3y that such possession was not 
too remote in point of time from the theft, and (4) that no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession has been given or 
appears from the evidence, then you may infer from those facts 
and find that the defendant stole the property and knew the 
property was stolen. 
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